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WELCOME TO THE MVSKOKE RESERVATION: MURPHY 
V. ROYAL, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, AND RESERVATION 




By restoring the Muscogee Creek Nation to § 1151(a) Indian Country 
status, Murphy v. Royal
1
 expanded the Muscogee Creek Nation’s rights to 
prosecute, regulate, and adjudicate cases pertaining to or involving 
American Indians
2
 or Alaska Natives within its reservation. While the 
Tenth Circuit’s denial of en banc review for Murphy caused a stir, the 
jurisdictional impacts that the State of Oklahoma fears are minimal because 
the case primarily impacts Native Americans or transactions with Native 
Americans. Subsequently, Murphy should be upheld because it primarily 
decreases state jurisdiction for cases involving Indian persons and entities, 
rather than non-Indians, much of which was already within the Muscogee 
Creek Nation’s jurisdiction. As a result, there is little change to the judicial 
expectation of the non-Indians living in the area. 
This Comment offers an understanding of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
Murphy, as well as the impacts the case might have on the residents of the 
Muscogee Creek Nation. Part I of this Comment provides an overview of 
the types of Indian Country and the Indian canons of construction. Part II 
discusses reservation diminishment cases leading up to Murphy, including 
relevant Tenth Circuit precedent. Part III examines Murphy, with an 
emphasis on the Tenth Circuit’s application of the Solem v. Bartlett
3
 test. 
Part IV analyzes how Murphy impacts federal, tribal, and state criminal 
jurisdiction in the Muscogee Creek Nation. Part V considers the impacts of 
Murphy on civil regulatory jurisdiction. Part VI examines how Murphy 
changes civil adjudicatory jurisdiction. Part VII revisits the actual impacts 
                                                                                                             
 * 3rd year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017) (cert. granted sub nom. Royal v. Murphy, docket no. 
17-1107). 
 2. The terms “Native American,” “Indian,” “American Indian,” and “tribal/tribe(s)” 
are used interchangeably in this Comment. It is well established that Indians prefer to be 
identified by a tribe that they are a member of first, followed by all other terms. 
Nevertheless, when discussing federal Indian law, the scope and applicability is often broad, 
making specification of a single tribe difficult. Therefore, general terms will be utilized here. 
Additionally, the Muscogee Creek Nation may be referred to as the Creek Nation in some 
historical quotations. 
 3. 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
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I. Relevant Indian Law Doctrines and Statutes 
This section will briefly address relevant areas of federal Indian law that 
inform and shape the outcome in Murphy. These areas include: the Indian 
law canons of construction and the reserved rights doctrine; the statutory 
types of Indian Country; diminishment and disestablishment jurisprudence; 
and precedential Tenth Circuit cases about the Muscogee Creek Nation. 
Covering these topics is necessary to fully understand the outcome of 
Murphy and why changing the statutorily-defined types of Indian Country 
impacts jurisdiction. 
A. The Indian Law Canons of Construction and the Reserved Rights 
Doctrine 
The Indian law canons of construction are a set of foundational 
interpretive theories unique to Indian law. The first canon requires that 
“treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders be liberally construed 
in favor of the Indians.”
5
 The second canon expands on the first, stating that 
“all ambiguities are to be resolved” in favor of the Indians.
6
 Third, all such 
treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders “are to be construed as 
the Indians would have understood them” at the time of their negotiation or 
passage.
7
 Sometimes the first and second canons are combined into one, 
and, as in the 2012 edition of Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 
the reserved rights doctrine is included among the canons as opposed to 
being viewed as a separate doctrine.
8
 The reserved rights doctrine states that 
                                                                                                             
 4. In order to limit the scope of this Comment, I will not address the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) claims present in Murphy. The habeas case law 
implicated by that analysis would make both the length and breadth of this Comment too 
unwieldy. Additionally, the AEDPA claims are less relevant to federal Indian law 
jurisprudence than other aspects of the case.  
 5. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1], at 113 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN]. 
 6. Id.; see also Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (“[W]e must be guided 
by that ‘eminently sound and vital canon’ that ‘statutes passed for the benefit of dependent 
Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor 
of the Indians.’”) (citation omitted) (quoting N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 
649, 655 n.7 (1976), and Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)).  
 7. COHEN, supra note 5, § 2.02[1], at 114; see also Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 
1072, 1079 (2016). 
 8. COHEN, supra note 5, § 2.02[1], at 114.  
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“tribal property rights and sovereignty are preserved unless Congress’s 
intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous.”
9
 In other words, tribes 
retain all rights they had at the time they entered into negotiations with the 
United States unless they were expressly ceded.  
The Indian law canons of construction are essential to the analysis of 
Murphy. The canons shape the Tenth Circuit’s deference to tribes through 
the court’s application of the Solem test, which is used to determine 
diminishment or disestablishment of a reservation, and the court’s 
application of the canons to all of the documents analyzed by the federal 
courts in Murphy. Subsequently, the deference given to Native Americans 
by federal courts serves as an invaluable tool for Petitioner-Appellant 
Murphy and by extension the Muscogee Creek Nation during the ongoing 
appellate process. 
B. Types of “Indian Country” – 18 U.S.C. § 1151 
The statute most important to understanding tribal jurisdiction is 18 
U.S.C. § 1151, which defines “Indian Country.” This section delineates 
where concurrent federal and tribal jurisdiction may exist, to the exclusion 
of the states, for both criminal and civil claims where there is at least one 
Indian party.
10
 Under § 1151, there are three different types of Indian 
Country, including: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding 
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running 
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities 
within the borders of the United States whether within the 
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether 
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian 
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running through the same.
11
 
The first type, § 1151(a) Indian Country, defines intact (as opposed to 
disestablished) reservations as those where tribal and federal jurisdiction 
coexist over all land within the bounds of that reservation, regardless of its 
owner’s Indian status or the fee status of the land.
12
 This section defines the 
                                                                                                             
 9. Id. 
 10. E.g., DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Court for Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 
(1975). 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
 12. Id. 
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legal status of most reservations, including the typical reservation of the 
American popular imagination. These are reservations that have not been 
disestablished but may have been reduced in size through a process known 
as diminishment. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the 
Muscogee Creek Nation possessed this type of jurisdiction within the 
boundaries of the 1866 treaty.
13
 
The second category, § 1151(b) Indian Country, defines “dependent 
Indian communities.”
14
 This category arises from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Sandoval, where the Court held that although 
the Pueblos held their land in fee since their time under Spanish 
subjugation, they needed protection from the onslaught of American 
westward expansion much like the rest of the tribes.
15
 The Court declared 
the resulting communities as “dependent Indian communities,” which share 
complete jurisdiction with the federal government.
16
 Pueblos are the typical 
example of § 1151(b) Indian Country, though there have been other 
applications of that category of Indian Country jurisdiction to off-
reservation tribal trusts or restricted title holdings.
17
 While case law 
indicates there could be § 1151(b) jurisdiction for off-reservation tribal 




Lastly, § 1151(c) Indian Country applies to Indian allotments, including 
those within the boundaries of diminished and disestablished reservations.
19
 
Commonly seen in Oklahoma, § 1151(c) Indian Country gives tribes and 
the federal government jurisdiction over land currently held in restricted 
Indian fee or trust by the federal government on behalf of either tribes or 
individual Indians, regardless of whether it is within an § 1151(a) 
reservation. Unlike § 1151(a) Indian Country, § 1151(c) does not rely on 
reservation boundaries, but instead relies on the title of the land.
20
 This is 
the type of Indian Country that most commonly leads to the infamous 
“checkerboard jurisdiction” problem, where § 1151(c) Indian Country 
parcels are scattered across a wide area of unrestricted fee land, especially 
                                                                                                             
 13. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 937-38 (10th Cir. 2017); see Treaty with the 
Creeks, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 785. 
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 
 15. 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).  
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012); COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[2][c][iii], at 193-94. 
 17. COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[2][c][iii], at 193-96. 
 18. See generally Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c).  
 20. Id.; see also COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[2][c][iv], at 197. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss2/4
No. 2] COMMENTS 359 
 
 
on disestablished reservations. The State of Oklahoma presumed that the 




II. Diminishment and Disestablishment 
The body of case law addressing the reduction of tribal land base and 
jurisdiction is referred to as either the diminishment or disestablishment 
cases. The definition provided in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey clarifies the 
difference between the two: “Although the terms ‘diminished’ and 
‘disestablished’ have at times been used interchangeably, disestablishment 
generally refers to the relatively rare elimination of a reservation while 
diminishment commonly refers to the reduction in size of a reservation” 
that occurred at some point in history.
22
 Disestablished reservations 
typically have § 1151(c) Indian Country jurisdiction over tribally-owned 
lands, as well as trust or restricted Indian title lands. Diminished 
reservations, on the other hand, can have any type of § 1151 jurisdiction. 
A. Who Has the Power to Diminish or Disestablish Reservations? 
Congress is granted the majority of the formal power to deal with Indians 
through the Indian Commerce Clause, the modern “treaty” process, and 
various Supreme Court decisions.
23
 In United States v. Kagama, the Court 
held that because of tribal dealings and treaties with the United States, the 
tribe had been rendered dependent on the United States due to the growth of 
its power.
24
 The Court also stated that “[f]rom [tribes’] very weakness and 
helplessness . . . there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.”
25
 
The power so described is congressional plenary authority over Indian 
affairs, including the power to abrogate treaties.
26
 
In South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Court explained that this 
plenary authority also gives Congress the extra-constitutional, unilateral 
power to change and terminate the Indian Country status of land, thereby 
giving Congress the power to change the type of jurisdiction applicable to 
                                                                                                             
 21. 2005 OK CR 25, ¶ 47, 124 P.3d 1198, 1207. 
 22. 188 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. After the U.S. House of Representatives expressed 
displeasure over not having a role in Indian negotiations, Congress passed the Act of Mar. 3, 
1871, ch. 106, 16 Stat. 471. Congress has since negotiated Indian statutes in lieu of treaties. 
 24. 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886). 
 25. Id. at 384. 
 26. Id.  
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 Subsequently, “the Supreme Court has said the ‘touchstone’ of 
whether a reservation’s boundaries have been altered is congressional 
purpose.”
28
 The explanation of congressional plenary power included in 
Yankton contributed to the design of the dispositive test found in Solem, 
which is used to determine reservation disestablishment. 
B. Solem v. Bartlett: The Diminishment and Disestablishment Test 
In Solem v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court was faced with another habeas 
case pertaining to whether a reservation had been diminished or 
disestablished, this time involving a man appealing his ten-year sentence in 
South Dakota.
29
 The reservation at issue was the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Reservation.
30
 The question before the Court was whether the 1908 
Cheyenne River Act diminished the boundaries of the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Reservation, rendering the locus of the crime outside of the Tribe’s § 
1151(a) Indian Country; or, whether the Act merely allowed for non-Indian 
settlement on the reservation, preserving the land’s status as Indian 
Country.
31
 Because the Supreme Court believed “[t]he effect of any given 
surplus land act depends on the language of the act and the circumstances 
underlying its passage,” the Court delineated a three-part test for 
disestablishment and diminishment to distinguish “surplus land acts that 
diminished reservations from those acts that simply offered non-Indians the 
opportunity to purchase land within established reservation boundaries.”
32
 
First, the Court declared that “[d]iminishment . . . will not be lightly 
inferred”: “Once a block of land is set aside for an Indian Reservation and 
no matter what happens to the title of the individual plots within the area, 
the entire block retains its reservation status until Congress explicitly 
indicates otherwise.”
33
 The Court then indicated that  
[t]he most probative evidence of congressional intent is the 
statutory language used to open the Indian lands. Explicit 
reference to cession or other language evidencing the present and 
                                                                                                             
 27. 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998) (“Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs, 
including the power to modify or eliminate tribal rights.”); see also COHEN, supra note 5, § 
3.04[3], at 198-99. 
 28. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 918 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Yankton, 522 U.S. at 
343).  
 29. 465 U.S. 463, 464-66 (1984). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 464-66 (citing Cheyenne River Act, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460 (1908)). 
 32. Id. at 469, 470. 
 33. Id. at 470. 
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total surrender of all tribal interests strongly suggests that 




Further, if any language fitting the prior description is present in 
conjunction with an “unconditional commitment” to compensate a tribe for 
any unallotted land, “there is an almost insurmountable presumption that 
Congress meant for the tribe’s reservation to be diminished.”
35
 
The second Solem factor considers evidence of contemporaneous debates 
and negotiations surrounding the surplus land act, looking specifically for 
evidence that “unequivocally reveal[s] a widely-held, contemporaneous 
understanding that the affected reservation would shrink as a result of the 
proposed legislation.”
36
 This second factor gives weight to the historical 
events surrounding the negotiations of a given treaty or statute. Examples of 
this type of evidence include contemporaneous legislative history, 
newspaper articles, and other types of historical record data. Prior to Solem, 
the Supreme Court allowed evidence under this category to prove 
congressional intent to diminish; since Solem, the second factor alone is 
insufficient to prove congressional intent.
37
 
The third and last factor considers events occurring “after the passage of 
a surplus land act” as ancillary evidence of congressional intent and 
includes evidence such as “Congress’s own treatment of the affected areas,” 
as well as “the manner in which the Bureau of Indian Affairs and local 
judicial authorities dealt with unallotted open areas.”
38
 Further, the Court 
considers the demographics of the affected area as evidence that “[w]here 
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a reservation and the 
area has long since lost its Indian character, . . . de facto, if not de jure, 
diminishment may have occurred.”
39
 The third factor is the least persuasive, 
and “[w]hen both an act and its legislative history”—or the first two parts 
of the test—“fail to provide substantial and compelling evidence of a 
congressional intention to diminish Indian lands, [courts] are bound by 
[their] traditional solicitude for the Indian tribes to rule that diminishment 
                                                                                                             
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 470-71. 
 36. Id. at 471. 
 37. See generally Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); cf. Osage Nation 
v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010) (post-Solem Tenth Circuit decision) (relying almost 
entirely on second factor evidence to find disestablishment of the Osage Nation 
Reservation). 
 38. Solem, 465 U.S. at 471. 
 39. Id.  
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did not take place . . ..”
40
 Thus, the Court held that if the first and second 
factors both fail, the third factor also fails due to the requirements in the 
Indian canons of construction that statutes and treaties be liberally 
construed in favor of Native Americans and that ambiguities be interpreted 
in favor of the Native Americans.
41
 
Solem also established that there is a presumption against 
disestablishment.
42
 Subsequently, congressional intent to diminish or 
disestablish a reservation must be “clear and plain.”
43
 This presumption 
supports the primacy of the first factor of the Solem test. In summary, the 
three-factor Solem test is the standard by which federal courts determine 
whether Congress intended to diminish or disestablish an Indian 
reservation. 
C. Key Diminishment Cases After Solem 
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on several 
diminishment/disestablishment cases since Solem, the most important of 
which are Hagen v. Utah and Nebraska v. Parker.
44
 In both of these cases, 
the Court applied the Solem test to determine whether the reservation at 
issue had been diminished or disestablished. The continual application of 
the Solem test by the Supreme Court supports the Tenth Circuit’s finding in 
Murphy that the Solem test is the governing law for diminishment and 
disestablishment cases. These cases also shape the Tenth Circuit’s 
application of the Solem test. 
1. Hagen v. Utah 
Ten years after its initial decision in Solem, the Supreme Court applied 
the Solem test in Hagen v. Utah.
45
 In Hagen, the Court found that Congress 
had diminished the Uintah Indian Reservation, meaning the locus of the 
case at bar was not in Indian Country.
46
 When applying the first Solem 
factor, the Court noted that it has “never required any particular form of 
words” to prove congressional intent to diminish or disestablish an Indian 
                                                                                                             
 40. Id. at 472. 
 41. COHEN, supra note 5, § 2.02[1], at 113-14. 
 42. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470-71, 481; see also COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[3], at 199. 
 43. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998).  
 44. The other case of note, Yankton, 522 U.S. 329, also applies the Solem test but is not 
particularly distinctive in its argumentation or result. 
 45. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).  
 46. Id. at 421-22.  
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 As such, the acts that restored surplus Uintah Reservation 
lands to the public domain for a lump compensatory sum sufficiently 
evidenced congressional intent to diminish the reservation, satisfying the 
dispositive first factor of the Solem test.
48
 
The Court then affirmed their conclusion with additional support from 
the second and third factors of the Solem test. When considering 
contemporaneous historical evidence, the Court emphasized how the 
relevant actions of both Congress and the Secretary of the Interior tracked 
the coincidental increase in congressional plenary power over Indian tribes 
and how that increase in power cemented congressional approval to open 
the surplus Uintah lands.
49
 Finally, applying the third factor, the Court 
contrasted the facts in Hagen with the facts in Solem by evidencing the non-
Indian character of the diminished Uintah lands.
50
 
2. Nebraska v. Parker 
In 2016, the Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed their support of the 
Solem test in Nebraska v. Parker.
51
 Based on the lack of any congressional 
intent to diminish or disestablish the Omaha Reservation, the Court held 
that the reservation remained intact.
52
 Most importantly, the Court refused 
to apply the third Solem factor and did not allow demographics alone to 




The Court reiterated that the first factor of the “well settled” Solem test 
requires demonstrating the existence of some evidence of clear intent to 
diminish a given reservation. These factors include: “[e]xplicit reference[s] 
to cession or other language evidencing the present and total surrender of 
all tribal interests;”
54
 “an unconditional commitment from Congress to 
compensate the Indian tribe for its opened land,” which, if provided in a 
lump sum payment along with explicit cession language, creates “an almost 
insurmountable presumption that Congress meant for the tribe’s reservation 
to be diminished;”
55
 or, alternatively, “[a] statutory provision restoring 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. at 411. 
 48. Id. at 414. 
 49. Id. at 416-20. 
 50. Id. at 420-21. 
 51. 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016). 
 52. Id. at 1082. 
 53. COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[3] (Supp. 2017). 
 54. Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1079 (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1984)) 
(internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original).  
 55. Id. 
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portions of the reservation to ‘the public domain’ [to] signif[y] 
diminishment.”
56
 The Court then succinctly found the surplus land act in 
question did not indicate congressional intent to diminish or disestablish the 
Omaha Reservation, and thus failed the first factor of the Solem test.
57
 
Because the first factor failed, the Court upheld post-Solem precedent and 
refused to allow evidence from the second or third factors to be 
dispositive.
58
 Even if the Court allowed this evidence, the second factor also 
failed because the contemporaneous legislative history did not provide any 
evidence of an intent to diminish.
59
  
What distinguishes Parker from other post-Solem disestablishment cases 
is that the Court upheld Solem and refused to allow the third factor to be 
dispositive when asked to consider extensive third-factor evidence of 
disestablishment. The consideration of the demographic and federal 
treatment evidence allowed by the third Solem factor indicated a clear 
absence of a strong Omaha presence in the area for decades.
60
 Nevertheless, 
the Court refused to overrule Solem and allow the federal and Nebraskan 
governments to have jurisdiction because it is not the Court’s role to 
“‘rewrite’ the 1882 Act
61
 in light of this subsequent demographic history,” 
or to overvalue the “limited interpretive value” of subsequent federal 
treatment of the lands in question.
62
  
D. Precedential Cases on the Status of Muscogee Creek Nation Indian 
Country 
Two Tenth Circuit cases also inform the court’s analysis in Murphy: 
Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Oklahoma and Osage Nation v. Irby. Indian 
Country, U.S.A. is a prior decision in which the Tenth Circuit discussed the 
Muscogee Creek Nation’s reservation’s lands as § 1151(a) lands rather than 
as § 1151(c) trust land, which ultimately laid groundwork for its decision in 
Murphy. Osage Nation is a disestablishment case in which the court moved 
away from the Supreme Court’s post-Solem precedent and ruled that the 
Osage Nation’s reservation had been disestablished based primarily on 
contemporaneous legislative history found under the second Solem factor. 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. (quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 414 (1994)).  
 57. Id. at 1079-80. 
 58. Id. at 1080-82.  
 59. Id. at 1080. 
 60. Id. at 1081. 
 61. The 1882 Act enabled the Secretary of the Interior to sell part of the Omaha 
reservation for “use by the Sioux City and Nebraska Railroad Company.” See id. at 1077. 
 62. Id. at 1082. 
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1. Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Oklahoma 
In Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Oklahoma, the Tenth Circuit held that “the 
Creek Reservation continues to exist, at least in some form.”
63
 The Tenth 
Circuit in Murphy noted that while diminishment was not at issue when 
deciding Indian Country, U.S.A., the court had decided that the “site at 
issue was ‘part of the original treaty lands still held by the Creek 
Nation . . . . These lands historically were considered Indian country and 
still retain their reservation status within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 
1151(a).’”
64
 This language from Indian Country, U.S.A. indicates that the 
Tenth Circuit had begun to consider the Muscogee Creek Nation as § 
1151(a) Indian Country as early as 1987.
65
 
2. Osage Nation v. Irby  
The State of Oklahoma relied heavily on the Tenth Circuit’s holding in 
Osage Nation v. Irby
66
 for its argument against the continued existence of 
the Muscogee Creek Nation reservation in Murphy. In Osage, the Tenth 
Circuit found the statutes in question to be ambiguous; therefore, the first 
factor of the Solem test was not conclusive.
67
 Subsequently, the Tenth 
Circuit moved to the second Solem factor, finding clear legislative history 
supporting the conclusion that all parties knew and understood the Osage 
Allotment Act disestablished the Osage Reservation.
68
 In regard to the 
second factor, the court cited historical evidence pertaining to how the 
Osage Allotment Act was negotiated, which “reflect[ed] clear congressional 
intent and Osage understanding that the reservation would be 
disestablished.”
69
 In regard to the third factor, the Tenth Circuit stated that 
the demographic shift after the Allotment Act supported the determination 
that the reservation had been disestablished.
70
 Thus, despite no clear 
evidence of congressional intent to diminish the Osage Reservation as 
required by the first Solem factor, the Tenth Circuit broke with the Supreme 
Court’s post-Solem precedent and concluded that the Osage Reservation 
had been disestablished based primarily on evidence from the second factor 
                                                                                                             
 63. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 937 (10th Cir. 2017) (discussing Indian Country, 
U.S.A. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
 64. Id. (quoting Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d at 976). 
 65. See generally Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d 967. 
 66. 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 67. Id. at 1123-24. 
 68. Id. at 1124 (discussing the Osage Allotment Act, ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539 (1906)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1127. 
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of the Solem test.
71
 This ruling is alarming because if the Supreme Court 
were to find the second factor dispositive like the Tenth Circuit did here, 
the usefulness of the Solem test as a tool for protecting tribal land bases 
would significantly diminish. 
III. Murphy v. Royal 
A. Facts of the Case 
Petitioner-Appellant Patrick Dwayne Murphy resided with Patsy Jacobs 
in August 1999.
72
 Ms. Jacobs had a child, George Jr., from a prior 
relationship with the victim, George Jacobs.
73
 Murphy and Ms. Jacobs had 
an argument concerning Mr. Jacobs, resulting in threats from Murphy that 
he was “‘going to get’ Mr. Jacobs and his family.”
74
 On the day of the 
crime, Mr. Jacobs was intoxicated and passed out in the back of his cousin, 
Mark Sumka’s, truck when they drove past Murphy and his two 
passengers.
75
 Both vehicles stopped, and though Murphy told Sumka “to 
turn off the car,” Sumka drove away.
76
 Murphy chased Sumka and forced 
Sumka’s car off the road.
77
 Murphy got out of his car and a fistfight ensued 
between the five men, during which Sumka fled the scene.
78
 He returned to 
the scene of the fight five minutes later to find Murphy throwing a knife 
into the woods and Mr. Jacobs lying in a ditch “barely breathing.”
79
 
Mr. Jacobs was found later in the same ditch “with his face bloodied and 
slashes across his chest and stomach.”
80
 Additionally, Mr. Jacobs’s genitals 
were severed before he was dragged from the roadway to the ditch where 
his throat and chest were cut.
81
 Murphy confessed to Ms. Jacobs upon 
returning to her home that he murdered Mr. Jacobs.
82
 The State 
subsequently charged Murphy with the first-degree murder of Mr. Jacobs 
and sought the death penalty.
83
 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. at 1126-28. 
 72. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 904 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 905. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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B. Relevant Procedural History
84
 
A jury convicted Petitioner-Appellant Murphy of first-degree murder in 
2000 in McIntosh County and sentenced him to death, partly due to the 
aggravating circumstances of the crime.
85
 Murphy’s conviction was 
affirmed twice, once in May of 2002, and again in March of 2003, on a 
direct appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA).
86
  
His second application to the State of Oklahoma for post-conviction 
relief alleged that, among other things, “Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction 
because the Major Crimes Act gives the federal government exclusive 
jurisdiction to prosecute murders committed by Indians in Indian 
country.”
87
 In the resulting evidentiary hearing, Mr. Murphy argued the 
crime occurred in § 1151 Indian Country under all three subtypes.
88
 The 
state court concluded that there was only state jurisdiction, not § 1151(c) 
Indian allotment land tribal jurisdiction, over the crime.
89
 The state court 
did not determine if there was § 1151(a) reservation or § 1151(b) dependent 
Indian community jurisdiction, despite the OCCA’s request for it to do so.
90
  
From that initial state court decision, Murphy “appealed to the OCCA,” 
which “denied relief on his jurisdictional . . . claims but granted limited 
relief on the Atkins claim” that pertained to whether Murphy was mentally 
competent to be executed.
91
 With respect to the jurisdictional issue, the 
OCCA did not agree with the state district court’s conclusion pertaining to 
the ownership of the road and the easement alongside of it, but upheld the 
finding that state jurisdiction was proper and that Murphy had shown 




After losing on his jurisdictional claim before the state, Murphy 
amended his federal habeas petition on December 28, 2005, to include that 
claim.
93
 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 
                                                                                                             
 84. For the complete procedural history, including extensive coverage of the habeas 
proceedings, see id. at 905-11. 
 85. Id. at 905 
 86. Id. at 905-06. 
 87. Id. at 907. 
 88. Id. at 907-08. 
 89. Id. at 908. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 908-09. 
 93. Id. at 910. 
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rejected all of his claims on August 1, 2007.
94
 In this application, Mr. 
Murphy’s jurisdictional claim only argued that the crime occurred either on 
§ 1151(a) reservation land or § 1151(c) Indian allotment land, leaving out 
the § 1151(b) dependent Indian community argument.
95
 The Eastern 
District of Oklahoma ruled that “the OCCA’s decisions against Mr. Murphy 
on these theories were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application 
of clearly established federal law” under the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
96
 Nevertheless, the Eastern District issued 
Murphy “three certificates of appealability (‘COAs’).”
97
  
After a prolonged Atkins mental capacity appeal process, the Tenth 
Circuit granted the jurisdictional certificate of appealability sua sponte.
98
 
On August 8, 2017, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the State of Oklahoma did 
not have jurisdiction over the prosecution because the Muscogee Creek 
Nation had not been disestablished; instead, the reservation remained 
intact.
99
 On November 9, 2017, the Tenth Circuit denied Oklahoma’s 
petition for en banc review, with “no judge on the original panel or the en 
banc court request[ing] that a poll be called.”
100
  
C. Legal Analysis 
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Murphy dealt with three cumulative 
issues. First, the court addressed “[w]hether there was clearly established 
federal law as determined by the Supreme Court when the OCCA addressed 
Mr. Murphy’s jurisdictional claim.”
101
 Second, the court examined 
“[w]hether the OCCA rendered a decision contrary to this clearly 
established law when it resolved Mr. Murphy’s jurisdictional claim.”
102
 
Third, the court considered “[w]hether the federal government has 
exclusive jurisdiction over Mr. Murphy’s case.”
103
 To briefly answer the 
three issues, the Tenth Circuit found that Solem was clearly established law 
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 
(2012)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 911. 
 99. Id. at 966. 
 100. Id. at 901. 
 101. Id. at 921. 
 102. Id. Because the second issue pertains to the AEDPA analysis, it will not be 
addressed in this Comment. 
 103. Id. 
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when Murphy was originally decided.
104
 Thus, the court found that the 
OCCA’s decisions were contrary to clearly established law because not 
only did it not consider the Solem test in its approach, but its approach was 
incompatible with the Solem test.
105
 Finally, the Tenth Circuit applied the 
Solem framework to the applicable treaties and statutes between the 
Muscogee Creek Nation and the United States to find the reservation still 
exists.
106
 As a result, the Tenth Circuit held that the federal government had 




D. First Issue: Whether the Solem Test Is Clearly Established Federal Law 
The first issue addressed by the Tenth Circuit disposes of whether the 
Solem test qualified as clearly established law in 2005. The Tenth Circuit 
held that the test was clearly established law and had been treated as such in 
numerous Supreme Court decisions since the case was decided in 1984.
108
 
To support its decision, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, 
along with a lengthy list of federal circuit and district courts, continued to 
apply the Solem test in subsequent decisions spanning from the mid-1980s 
until the 2005 OCCA decision.
109
 Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit held that 
Solem provided the governing test when the OCCA decided in 2005 
whether the Muscogee Creek Nation had been disestablished.
110
 
E. Second Issue: Whether Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Is Proper 
The Tenth Circuit then applied the Solem framework to the unique 
history surrounding the Muscogee Creek Nation reservation. In order for 
the State of Oklahoma to successfully prove disestablishment under the 
Solem test, it had to first show unequivocal statutory evidence of 
congressional intent to disestablish the boundaries of the Muscogee Creek 
Nation.
111
 While both contemporaneous historical evidence and present 
demographic evidence can support the first Solem factor, current Supreme 
Court jurisprudence holds that the latter two portions of the Solem test are 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id. at 921-23. 
 105. Id. at 926-28. 
 106. Id. at 937-48. 
 107. Id. at 966. 
 108. Id. at 921-23. 
 109. Id. For examples of Supreme Court cases, see generally South Dakota v. Yankton 
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994). 
 110. Murphy, 875 F.3d at 922-23 (noting the Supreme Court’s recognition that a “legal 
framework for evaluating a given type of claim can constitute clearly established law”).  
 111. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470-72 (1984). 
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insufficient to prove disestablishment or diminishment without the first.
112
 
The Tenth Circuit, however, does allow for the second Solem factor to 
prove disestablishment if the contemporaneous historical evidence 




1. The First Solem Factor 
The State of Oklahoma argued the “collective weight of eight different 
laws enacted between 1893 and 1906”—as opposed to express language of 
cession, a lump sum payment, or reference to returning the land to the 
public domain—proved congressional intent to diminish the Muscogee 
Creek Nation.
114
 Nevertheless, the court found that none of the statutes 
satisfied the first factor of the Solem test.
115
  
The Tenth Circuit addressed each statute in chronological order, 
beginning with the Act of March 3, 1893. The law in question was an 
appropriations act that also “gave ‘the consent of the United States’ to the 
allotment of lands ‘within the limits of the country occupied by the 
Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and [S]eminoles.’”
116
 The court 
noted, however, that this Act merely established the Dawes Commission 




The Act of June 10, 1896, was likewise unpersuasive, as it once again 
merely appropriated funds for treaty negotiation with the Muscogee Creek 
Nation and provided instructions to the Dawes Commission “for the 
purpose of ‘rectify[ing] the many inequalities and discriminations’ in the 
[Indian] Territory and ‘afford[ing] needful protection to the lives and 
property of all citizens and residents thereof.’”
118
 
The third appropriations act cited by the State changed federal and tribal 
jurisdiction in the Indian Territory by granting exclusive jurisdiction to the 
United States.
119
 It also made all legislation by the Five Tribes subject to 
                                                                                                             
 112. Id. 
 113. See generally Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 114. Murphy, 875 F.3d at 938. 
 115. Id. at 938-39. 
 116. Id. at 939-40 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 15, 27 Stat. 612, 645) 
(alternation in original). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 940 (quoting Act of June 10, 1896, ch. 398, 29 Stat. 321, 340) (first and third 
alterations in original). 
 119. Id. at 940-41 (citing Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62). 
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the President of the United States’ veto power.
120
 Nevertheless, the Act of 
June 7, 1897, did not disestablish the Muscogee Creek Reservation.
121
 
As its fourth supporting statute, the State proffered the Curtis Act. The 
Curtis Act abolished tribal courts, declared tribal law unenforceable, and 
transferred all tribal court cases to the federal court within the Indian 
Territory.
122
 Federal payments were then dispersed to individual tribal 
members instead of tribes.
123
 Finally, the Curtis Act included a default 
allotment plan and a proposed allotment plan for the Creeks; however, the 
Muscogee Creek Nation refused to ratify it and negotiated its own allotment 
agreement with the United States later.
124
 Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
the Curtis Act reshaped governance in the Indian Territory, it did not 
change the borders of the Muscogee Creek Nation.
125
  
The Muscogee Creek Nation negotiated its own individual allotment 
agreement which specified that it superseded any “conflicting federal 
statutes.” 
126
 The Original Allotment Agreement of 1901 addressed four 
different issues: (1) general allotment, (2) town sites, (3) tribally-held lands, 
and (4) future Creek governance over areas within their borders.
127
 
The Agreement provided that aside from those lands reserved for either 
tribal or town purposes, all Creek lands were to be “appraised and allotted 
among the citizens of the tribe” deemed eligible based on the tribal 
citizenship rolls.
128
 Each Muscogee Creek citizen “would receive an 
allotment of 160 acres valued at $6.50 per acre.”
129
 Each allotment 
transferred “all right, title and interest of the Creek Nation and of all other 
citizens in and to the lands embraced in [the] allotment certificate” in 
exchange for that allottee’s consent to allotment and relinquishment of any 
claims to other Creek lands.
130
 While the Creek citizens received their 
allotments in fee, the Secretary of the Interior still had to approve most 
                                                                                                             
 120. Id. at 941 (citing 30 Stat. at 84). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (citing Curtis Act, ch. 517, §§ 26, 28, 30 Stat. 495, 504-05 (1898)). 
 123. Id. (citing Curtis Act § 19, 30 Stat. at 502). 
 124. Id. (citing Curtis Act § 11, 30 Stat. at 497-98). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement, ch. 676, ¶¶ 41, 44, 31 Stat. 861, 872 
(1901)). 
 127. Id. at 941-44. 
 128. Id. at 941-42 (quoting Original Allotment Agreement ¶¶ 2-3, 31 Stat. at 862-63) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 129. Id. at 942 (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 3, 31 Stat. at 862). 
 130. Id. (quoting Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 23, 31 Stat. at 868) (internal 
quotations omitted) (alteration in original). 
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encumbrances or alienations of their allotments, resulting in the type of 
Indian title known as restricted Indian fee.
131




 Any surplus lands were to be used, along with any funds from preceding 
treaties, “for the purpose of equalizing allotment[]” values for those tribal 
members who received less valuable tracts of land.
133
 If a tribal member 
received an allotment worth more than the baseline value, then the 
difference could be charged against other entitlements the tribal member 
had right to claim.
134
  
Town sites and tribal use lands were exempted from the general 
allotment provision. Towns of more than 200 residents were “surveyed, laid 
out, and appraised” before town commissions sold lots “for the benefit of 
the tribe.”
135
 Per the statute, “‘[a]ny person,’ not just Creek citizens, ‘in 
rightful possession of any town lot having improvements thereon’” had 
right of first refusal.
136
 The town commission auctioned off unimproved lots 
within a year of the appraisal.
137
 At their option, the Creeks also reserved 
lands for tribal purposes, such as “Creek schools and orphan homes; 
cemeteries; a university; Creek courthouses, and churches and schools 
outside of towns.”
138
 If these properties ever fell into disuse, the act 
provided for auctioning them off to Creek citizens only.
139
   
Lastly, the Original Allotment Agreement provided the roles of both 
tribal and federal government, at least temporarily, in the newly allotted 
Muscogee Creek Nation.
140
 Creek governmental authority, though limited, 
did persist in the form of “legislative authority over both unallotted tribal 
lands and allotted lands” and numerous other functions.
141
 While the 
Original Allotment Act envisioned continuing tribal authority as temporary, 
Congress negated the tribal government dissolution provision in the Act 
                                                                                                             
 131. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 7, 31 Stat. at 863-64). 
 132. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 37, 31 Stat. at 871). 
 133. Id. (quoting Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 9, 31 Stat. at 864). 
 134. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 3, 31 Stat. at 862-63). 
 135. Id. at 943 (quoting Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 10, 31 Stat. at 864, 865) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 136. Id. (quoting Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 11, 31 Stat. at 866). 
 137. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 14, 31 Stat. at 866). 
 138. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 24(c)-(p), 31 Stat. at 868-69) (citations 
omitted). 
 139. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 24, 31 Stat. at 869). 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 42, 31 Stat. at 872). 
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before the Muscogee Creek government ever dissolved.
142
 Meanwhile, the 
United States assumed some powers that pertained directly to the 
movement of certain types of commercial and tax activities across the 
Creek Nation borders.
143
 In sum, not only is there no evidence of 
disestablishment, but the Original Allotment Agreement repeatedly 
reaffirmed the borders of the Creek Nation.
144
 
The Supplemental Allotment Agreement, Oklahoma’s sixth supporting 
document, primarily served as a set of clarifications for the Original 
Allotment Agreement.
145
 Most relevant to the present case is the fact that 
the Supplemental Agreement renewed the anti-encumbrance and alienation 
provisions as well as clarified the lease restrictions.
146
 No provision in the 




Shortly after Congress reauthorized the continued existence of the Creek 
government on March 2, 1906—two days before statutory dissolution—it 
enacted the Five Tribes Act, which recognized the indefinite existence of 
the Creek Government while further restricting its power.
148
 Most 
importantly, the new restrictions gave the Secretary of the Interior the 
power “to sell unallotted lands not otherwise provided for and deposit the 
proceeds into the Treasury for the Tribe’s benefit.”
149
 The Tenth Circuit 
agreed that this Act also did not disestablish the Creek Reservation.
150
 
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit considered the Oklahoma Enabling Act. The 
Enabling Act “granted permission to the inhabitants of both the Territory of 
Oklahoma and the Indian Territory to adopt a constitution and seek 
admittance into the Union as the State of Oklahoma.”
151
 In the Enabling 
Act, Congress explicitly prohibited the state constitution from in any way 
“limit[ing] or impair[ing] the rights of person or property pertaining to the 
Indians of said Territories” or to give the power to do so to the United 
States.
152
 The Tenth Circuit, reiterating its analysis from Osage Nation, 
                                                                                                             
 142. Id. at 944. 
 143. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶¶ 37-38, 31 Stat. at 871). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 944-45. 
 146. Id. at 945 (citing Supplemental Allotment Agreement, ch. 1323, ¶ 16, 32 Stat. 500, 
503 (1902)). 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 945-46. 
 149. Id. at 946 (citing Five Tribes Act, ch. 1876, § 16, 34 Stat. 137, 143 (1906)). 
 150. Id. at 947. 
 151. Id. (citing Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, § 1, 34 Stat. 267, 267-68 (1906)). 
 152. Id.  
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After analyzing all eight statutes the State proffered to satisfy the first 
Solem factor, the Tenth Circuit provided three reasons why these statutes 
failed to disestablish the Muscogee Creek Reservation.
154
 First, “the statutes 
lack[ed] any of the textual ‘hallmarks’ demonstrating congressional intent 
to disestablish, and no other language show[ed] Congress altered the Creek 
Reservation’s boundaries.”
155
 Second, “specific statutory language—‘[t]he 
most probative evidence of congressional intent’—shows Congress 
continued to recognize the Reservation’s borders.”
156
 Lastly, the Tenth 
Circuit reasoned that “the State’s reliance on the statutes’ reforms of title 
and governance arrangements within the Reservation [was] unavailing 
because these changes did not disestablish the Reservation.”
157
 
The absence of any “hallmark” language of intended disestablishment in 
all of these statutes is the strongest evidence against disestablishment. 
Before listing numerous examples, the Tenth Circuit reiterated that “[t]he 
absence of such language is notable because Congress is fully capable of 
stating its intention to disestablish or diminish a reservation.”
158
 Further, the 
court noted that Congress went so far as to clearly delineate the boundaries 
of the Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation in several of the Acts cited by 
the State of Oklahoma.
159
 While no magic phrase is required to prove 
congressional intent to diminish, the court found no statutory language, 
“whatever it may be,” that satisfactorily established an express 
congressional intent to diminish the Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation.
160
 
The Tenth Circuit pointed out that not only was there a lack of express 
textual language, but there was evidence of congressional recognition of the 
Muscogee Creek Reservation. Citing the Original Allotment Agreement’s 
reservation of land for tribal purposes, the court recognized that “Solem 
explained that retention of lands for tribal purposes ‘strongly suggests’ 
continued reservation status.”
161
 Additionally, the absence of a “sum-certain 
                                                                                                             
 153. Id. at 948 (quoting Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010)). 
 154. Id. at 948. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984)) (alteration in original) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 948-49. 
 159. Id. at 949-50. 
 160. Id. at 951 (quoting Wyoming v. EPA, 849 F.3d 861, 869 (10th Cir. 2017)). 
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payment to the Creek Nation for all—or even a portion of—its land” further 




Lastly, the Tenth Circuit was not persuaded by the State of Oklahoma’s 
argument that the title and governance edicts found in the congressional 
acts support disestablishment. The main reason the court found those 
arguments unpersuasive was because those questions, as addressed in the 
congressional acts cited by the State of Oklahoma, had nothing to do with 
the boundaries of the Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation.
163
 Further, the 
Tenth Circuit recognized that “‘the Supreme Court has required that 
specific congressional intent to diminish boundaries . . . be clearly 
established’” in the congressional acts.
164
 
2. The Second Solem Factor 
When examining the contemporaneous historical evidence, the Tenth 
Circuit distinguished its finding in Osage Nation from the facts of Murphy. 
The court acknowledged that even though it found disestablishment in 
Osage Nation based on the second factor of Solem, it did so because “the 
legislative history and the negotiation process [made] clear that all the 
parties at the table understood that the Osage reservation would be 
disestablished by the Osage Allotment Act.”
165
 Conversely, the court found 
no such explicit evidence in Murphy.
166
 Further, the Tenth Circuit clarified 
that even if the State had proffered second factor evidence to support its 
argument under the first factor of the Solem test, the court would not have 
ruled in favor of disestablishment.
167
 Since the first Solem factor is 
dispositive, the court held that 
[b]ecause no clear textual evidence shows Congress 
disestablished the Creek Reservation at step one, it is enough for 
us to say at step two that the “historical evidence in no way 
unequivocally reveal[s] a widely held, contemporaneous 
                                                                                                             
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 952 (quoting Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 
1394-95 (10th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 165. Id. at 954 (quoting Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir. 2010)) 
(internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. at 954 n.64. 
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understanding that the affected reservation would shrink as a 
result of the proposed legislation.”
168
  
3. The Third Solem Factor 
The final factor of the Solem test considers evidence of federal and local 
treatment of the land, as well as the demographic history of the land since 
the point of alleged diminishment or disestablishment, with specific 
emphasis on evidence immediately following the enactment of the relevant 
laws.
169
 Particular attention is paid to how Congress and the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs treated the land in question.
170
 Importantly, Solem makes 
clear that evidence from this factor is the least persuasive, allowing the 
Tenth Circuit to follow the Supreme Court’s trend of “never [having] relied 
solely on this third consideration to find diminishment.”
171
 In relation to 
Oklahoma’s past assertions of jurisdiction in the Muscogee Creek Nation, 
the Tenth Circuit quoted its analysis in Indian Country, U.S.A., reasserting 
that despite Oklahoma’s encroachment on Creek jurisdiction,  
“the past failure to challenge Oklahoma’s jurisdiction over Creek 
Nation lands, or to treat them as reservation lands, [did] not 
divest the federal government of its exclusive authority over 
relations with the Creek Nation or negate Congress’ intent to 





The Tenth Circuit held that because the Solem analysis failed to prove 
diminishment or disestablishment of the Muscogee Creek Nation 
Reservation, the crime occurred on an § 1151(a) reservation.
173
 
Subsequently, Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Mr. Murphy, an 
Indian accused of committing a felony in Indian Country, because the 
Major Crimes Act grants exclusive jurisdiction of his case to the federal 
government.
174
 As a result, “[t]he decision whether to prosecute Mr. 
                                                                                                             
 168. Id. at 959 (quoting Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1080 (2016)) (second 
alteration in original). 
 169. Id. at 960. 
 170. Id. at 960-62. 
 171. Id. at 960 (quoting Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1081) (internal quotations omitted). 
 172. Id. at 964 (quoting Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967, 974 (10th 
Cir. 1987)). 
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Murphy in federal court rests with the United States” because his “state 
conviction and death sentence are . . . invalid.”
175
 
IV. Impacts of the Murphy Decision on Criminal Jurisdiction 
This section examines how the Murphy decision will impact the lives of 
both Indian and non-Indian residents of the Muscogee Creek Reservation if 
Murphy remains the law. The jurisdictional areas addressed generally are: 
criminal, civil regulatory, and civil adjudicatory. Not every jurisdictional 
statute or sub-area of jurisdiction is addressed here. This Comment is meant 
to serve as an overview of the possible impacts on jurisdiction in the areas 
included in the Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation and is not exhaustive. 
This cursory introduction, however, illuminates the minimal impacts of the 
Murphy decision on the day-to-day life of Muscogee Creek Nation residents 
within the 1866 boundaries of the Muscogee Creek Nation as § 1151(a) 
Indian Country.  
A. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction over Enumerated Felonies with an Indian 
Defendant: Major Crimes Act – 18 U.S.C. § 1153 
As a result of the Murphy decision, the federal government will have 
exclusive jurisdiction over enumerated felonies involving an Indian 
defendant. The statute giving exclusive jurisdiction over certain felonies 
perpetrated by an Indian is 18 U.S.C. § 1153, commonly known as the 
Major Crimes Act. The relevant section of the current statute is as follows:  
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of 
another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, 
namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony 
under chapter 109A [sexual abuse], incest, a felony assault under 
section 113, an assault against an individual who has not attained 
the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, 
burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title 
within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and 
penalties as all other persons committing any of the above 
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
176
 
Originally enacted in 1885, the section that became the Major Crimes 
Act was the final provision of the Indian Department appropriations bill for 
                                                                                                             
 175. Id. 
 176. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. II 2014).  
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 Congress passed the Major Crimes Act in direct response to Ex 
parte Crow Dog
178
 to give the federal judiciary complete control over the 
felony prosecution of Indians committing crimes in Indian Country.
179
 In 
Crow Dog, the Supreme Court ruled that federal law had no role in 
prosecuting Indian-on-Indian crimes, and that the remedies demanded by 
the processes of the tribe of the wronged party were sufficient.
180
  
Today, the Major Crimes Act remains one of the cardinal statutes for 
determining proper criminal jurisdiction in cases involving Native 
American defendants in Indian Country. If the locus of the crime is in 
Indian Country, the defendant is an enrolled member of a federally-
recognized tribe, and the alleged crime is one of the enumerated felonies in 
§ 1153, then federal courts have jurisdiction exclusive of the states. The 




One unanswered question is whether the Major Crimes Act extinguishes 
tribal jurisdiction over these enumerated felonies.
182
 This question is further 
complicated by the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, which amended the 
Indian Civil Rights Act to allow tribes to expand sentencing power from 
less than one year to up to three years per offense, and for a total of nine 
years per criminal proceeding.
183
 As a result, tribes may elect to have felony 
sentencing power so long as the defendant is a person who “(1) has been 
previously convicted of the same or a comparable offense by any 
jurisdiction in the United States; or (2) is being prosecuted for an offense 
that would be punishable by more than 1 year of imprisonment if 
prosecuted by the United States or any of the States.”
184
 Tribes must also 
“[provide] indigent defense counsel and a law-trained and bar-licensed 
judge, make publicly available their laws and rules, and try the defendant in 
a court of record.”
185




                                                                                                             
 177. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385.  
 178. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
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B. Almost Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Defendants and 
Concurrent Federal/Tribal Jurisdiction over Indian Defendants Against 
Non-Indian Plaintiffs: Indian Country Crimes Act 
Because of Murphy, the Muscogee Creek Nation Tribal Court will now 
have concurrent jurisdiction over all unenumerated offenses—those not 
under the Major Crimes Act—involving Indian defendants against non-
Indian plaintiffs on the reservation. The Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1152, applies the “general laws of the United States” to all § 1151 
Indian Country, minus three exceptions.
187
 The first exception is that the 
Indian Country Crimes Act shall not apply to crimes “committed by one 
Indian against the person or property of another Indian.”
188
 The second 
exception is that the Indian Country Crimes Act does not apply to Indians 
already punished by their tribe for the same offense.
189
 The final exception 




As a result, all crimes committed by or against an Indian in which one 
party is a non-Indian can be prosecuted by the federal government under 
this statute, “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law.”
191
 Within § 
1151 Indian Country, the only other sovereigns with the power to prosecute 
criminal cases involving one or more Indian parties are tribes, meaning 
tribes may have concurrent jurisdiction for some types of cases. But, 
because of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, tribal courts do not have 
jurisdiction over non-Indians for most crimes.
192
 Subsequently, the Indian 
Country Crimes Act essentially grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal 
government for most offenses committed in § 1151 Indian Country 
involving at least one non-Indian party. Additionally, § 1152 also provides 
the federal government with concurrent jurisdiction alongside tribal 
governments over crimes against non-Indians by an Indian defendant.
193
 
At present, the only exception to the Oliphant decision that expands 
tribal concurrent jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants is the Violence 
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (“VAWA 2013”).
194
 Under 
VAWA 2013, tribes may now elect to prosecute non-Indian perpetrators for 
                                                                                                             
 187. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). 
 188. Id. 
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domestic violence, dating violence, or criminal violations of protective 
orders so long as the defendant “[has] ties to the Indian tribe.”
195
 In order to 
have sufficient ties to a tribe, the defendant must:  
 (i) reside[] in the Indian country of the participating tribe; 
 (ii) [be] employed in the Indian country of the participating 
tribe; or 
 (iii) [be] a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of— 
  (I) a member of the participating tribe; or 




Supporting increased comity between the federal and tribal courts on this 
issue, the Supreme Court has also held that tribal court convictions can be 
used to establish habitual offender status in federal court without violating 
the Sixth Amendment.
197
 The Muscogee Creek Nation adopted the VAWA 
2013 expansion in 2016.
198
  
C. Exclusive Jurisdiction for Indian on Indian Unenumerated Felonies and 
Misdemeanors 
As first recognized under Talton v. Mayes, tribes have the inherent 
sovereign power to prosecute tribal offenders.
199
 Nevertheless, after Duro v. 
Reina, where the Court held that tribes lacked the “inherent or sovereign 
authority to prosecute . . . ‘nonmember Indian[s],’”
200
 Congress amended 
25 U.S.C. § 1301 to delineate that tribes have the “inherent power . . . , 
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians.”
201
 This legislation is known colloquially as “the Duro-fix.”
202
 
Thus, since the Court in Lara held that “Congress does possess the 
constitutional power to lift the restrictions on the tribes’ criminal 
                                                                                                             
 195. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(B), (c). 
 196. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(B). 
 197. See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). 
 198. MUSCOGEE CREEK NATION CODE ANN. § 16-038 (2016). 
 199. 163 U.S. 376 (1896); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).  
 200. Lara, 541 U.S. at 197 (emphasis omitted) (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 682 
(1990)). 
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 tribes once again have full criminal jurisdiction for crimes 
by Indians against another Indian, so long as tribal jurisdiction is not 
precluded by the Major Crimes Act. Because the Muscogee Creek Nation 
already properly had jurisdiction over this type of crime, Murphy will only 
expand the tribe’s jurisdictional area. 
D. Exclusive Jurisdiction over Non-Indian on Non-Indian Crimes in Indian 
Country 
Due to the line of cases following United States v. McBratney, states 
have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes in which all parties are non-
Indians.
204
 Beginning with McBratney, the Supreme Court held that neither 
tribes nor the federal government have an interest in crimes involving only 
non-Indians that occur in Indian Country.
205
 The latter two cases, Ray and 
Draper, merely extend the premise of McBratney to all states, regardless of 
the terms of their territorial governmental structure or enabling act.
206
 
Murphy will not change this jurisdiction whatsoever. 
E. Criminal Jurisdiction and Murphy 
If Murphy is upheld by the United States Supreme Court, the biggest 
impact to criminal jurisdiction will be that all cases involving an Indian 
victim or defendant will be heard in either tribal or federal court. This 
means that non-Indians will likely be tried in federal court if they commit a 
crime in Indian Country against an Indian. However, no crimes between 
solely non-Indians will be heard in tribal court.  
As a result of increased prosecutorial responsibility, the Muscogee Creek 
Nation will have to absorb an increase in criminal prosecutions, as will the 
Eastern District of Oklahoma. Because the Muscogee Creek Nation has 
taken the VAWA 2013 special criminal jurisdiction expansion, the Tribe 
will be able to prosecute some non-Indians for domestic violence, dating 
violence, or for criminal violations of protective orders. By adopting the 
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 sentencing expansion, the Muscogee 
Creek Nation will be able to give short felony sentences, as well.  
For law enforcement agencies, expansion of already existing cross-
deputization agreements between local, state, and Muscogee Creek Nation 
law enforcement will ensure efficient policing continues on the Muscogee 
                                                                                                             
 203. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200. 
 204. See generally United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); Draper v. United 
States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946). 
 205. McBratney, 104 U.S. at 621-22, 624. 
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Creek Nation Reservation. Cross-deputization agreements allow 
participating law enforcement agencies to arrest and transfer individuals 
who could be under the jurisdiction of any signatory agency without the 
fear of constitutional rights violations.
207
 As of January 2018, the Muscogee 
Creek Nation already had cross-deputization agreements with several 
municipal, county, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies, 
including the Bureau of Indian Affairs Office of Law Enforcement Services 




 and the City of 
Tulsa,
210
 to name a few.
211
 
Through cross-deputization agreements and increased inter-agency 
cooperation, there is a reasonable likelihood that state policing will suffer 
little to no negative impact, even in densely-populated areas like Tulsa. 
This conclusion is supported by evidence from cross-deputization 
agreements that are already in operation.
212
 
V. Impacts on Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction 
A. General Tribal Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction  
First recognized in Worcester v. Georgia, tribes have inherent sovereign 
power to legislate and adjudicate civil conduct over not only their own 
members, but, unless otherwise limited by the federal government, also 
nonmember Indians and non-Indians who enter their jurisdictions.
213
 
Federal restrictions on Indian civil jurisdiction most commonly arise out of 
                                                                                                             
 207. See generally COHEN, supra note 5, § 6.05, at 588-94. 
 208. Muscogee Creek Nation Tribal Resolution 12-065 (May 19, 2012), https://www. 
sos.ok.gov/documents/filelog/89678.pdf. 
 209. Intergovernmental Cross-Deputization Agreement Between the United States, the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the County of Muskogee (Apr. 15, 2002), https://www. 
sos.ok.gov/documents/filelog/57021.pdf (addendum). 
 210. Intergovernmental Cross-Deputization Agreement Between the United States, the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the City of Tulsa (Jan. 18, 2006), https://www.sos.ok.gov/ 
documents/filelog/63941.pdf. 
 211. Some compacts may have lapsed or changed by the time of publication. 
 212. Nicole Marshall, Common Ground Found by Officers, TULSA WORLD (Dec. 12, 
2010), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/local/common-ground-found-by-officers/article_ 
72938327-38e9-580f-9ebc-84aaa5a6782e.html; D.E. Smoot, County and Creek Law 
Enforcers Approve Agreement, MUSKOGEE PHOENIX (Jun. 11, 2017), http://www.muskogee 
phoenix.com/news/county-and-creek-law-enforcers-approve-agreement/article_4d5539fe-
69ca-586b-9411-a1a34266a7be.html.  
 213. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.01[2][c], [f], at 216-18, 222; 
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statutory or treaty abrogation.
214
 Within the last forty years, the Supreme 
Court began to limit tribal sovereign authority pertaining to civil 




In Montana, the Supreme Court held that absent one of two exceptions, 
tribes do not have the authority to regulate non-Indian conduct on non-
Indian-owned fee land within reservations.
216
 These two exceptions are 
known as the Montana 1 and Montana 2 exceptions. First, “[a] tribe may 
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of 
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements.”
217
 Second, “[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to 
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within 
its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.”
218
 These two exceptions are the primary means by which Indian civil 
legislative authority applies to non-Indians on non-Indian-owned fee land in 
§ 1151(a) Indian Country, and would be the only means by which non-
Indians would feel an increase in Muscogee Creek Nation authority if 
Murphy is upheld. Otherwise, the Muscogee Creek Nation already has 
inherent regulatory authority over restricted or trust lands in its reservation. 
Therefore, the only expansion would be to non-Indian owned land, which is 
restricted by the Montana line of cases. 
The cases following Montana, including Atkinson Trading Co. v. 
Shirley
219
 and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima 
Indian Nation,
220
 indicate a preference for further limiting the Montana 2 
exception. Brendale limited the Yakima’s authority to regulate zoning in 
areas of its reservation that the Court considered “open” or heavily 
populated by non-Indians while allowing tribal regulation in “closed” areas 
that had retained their “Indian character.”
221
 In Atkinson Trading Co., the 
Supreme Court held that non-Indian owned fee lands included in an 
addition to the Diné (Navajo) reservation after their purchase by non-
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 215. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).  
 216. Id. at 565-66. 
 217. Id. at 565. 
 218. Id. at 566. 
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Indians were not under the civil regulatory jurisdiction of the tribe.
222
 As a 
result, increases in regulatory authority granted to the Muscogee Creek 
Nation over non-Indian-owned fee land by the recognition of its reservation 
will typically be limited to the authority allowed by the Montana 
exceptions. 
B. Environmental Regulation and Murphy 
While the State of Oklahoma claims in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
that the Tenth Circuit’s decision “open[s] up a Pandora’s Box of questions 
regarding the State’s regulatory power,” several of these jurisdictional 
questions are simple matters of statutory application.
223
 One of the 
questions proffered by the State was whether the State of Oklahoma will 
retain enforcement authority under Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) statutes.
224
 This question, however, has already been answered by 
Congress in favor of the State, and the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Murphy 
does not impact the enforcement of the governing statute.  
After Congress passed section 10211 as a rider on a transportation bill, 
the EPA is required to grant the State of Oklahoma enforcement authority 
over tribal lands if the State has an approved regulatory program for that 
statute and if the State requests such authority.
225
 Further, Oklahoma tribes 
that qualify to participate in the EPA’s Tribes As States (“TAS”) program 
cannot do so without the State of Oklahoma’s permission.
226
 If the State 
does approve the tribe’s application for TAS status, the tribe seeking such 
authority must also agree to enter into an environmental regulation compact 
agreement with the State.
227
  
As a result, there are no circumstances in which the State of Oklahoma 
would lose this type of regulatory authority to the EPA without a clear act 
of Congress or the elimination of section 10211. Congress has expressly 
abrogated the rights of Oklahoma tribes to pursue TAS status without state 
consent and without any conditional language pertaining to the type of 
Indian Country the tribe possessed. Therefore, the type of Indian Country 
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 223. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Royal v. Murphy, No. 17-1107 (U.S. Feb. 6, 
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possessed by the Muscogee Creek Nation has no impact on Oklahoma’s 
EPA statutory enforcement authority. 
VI. Impacts on Civil Adjudicatory Jurisdiction  
As discussed previously, Indian tribes have the inherent authority to 
regulate and adjudicate civil matters within their lands so long as that power 
has not been limited or divested.
228
 On the reservation, the Muscogee Creek 
Nation will have exclusive civil adjudicatory jurisdiction. Williams v. Lee is 
the case that controls for conflicts in which an Indian defendant is sued by a 
non-Indian over a civil cause of action arising in Indian Country.
229
 
Williams, a civil jurisdiction case involving a licensed Indian trader’s 
dispute with an individual tribal member on the Navajo reservation, set the 
foundational civil law standard that “absent [a] governing [a]ct[] of 
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringe[s] 
on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by 
them.”
230
 Williams sets the most liberal standard for determining whether 
tribal civil jurisdiction is proper because state jurisdiction over transactions 
on the reservation between Indians and non-Indians would impede tribal 
self-governance.
231
 Subsequently, the Court generally recognizes that a tribe 
has inherent jurisdiction over transactions between members and non-
members in its Indian Country.
232
 
Tribal civil adjudicatory authority is, however, restricted. After Strate v. 
A-1 Contractors, the Montana test also applies to determine whether tribal 
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction exists for incidents arising from non-Indian 
conduct on non-Indian-owned fee land.
233
 In Strate, the Court held that the 
right-of-way for the highway that ran through the reservation was not under 
tribal governance for purposes of civil adjudicatory jurisdiction.
234
 The 
Court reasoned that the Tribe did not have a valid adjudicatory concern, 
“even though careless driving on a reservation highway threatens the health 
and safety of tribal members”; therefore, state jurisdiction sufficed.
235
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Another important outcome of Strate is an additional implicit divestiture 
restriction on tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction arising from the Montana 
test. The Court held that “[a]s to nonmembers, . . . a tribe’s adjudicative 
jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”
236
 Subsequently, 
tribes are only able to adjudicate disputes over non-Indians that they also 
have regulatory authority over, unless an act of Congress has expanded 
their authority.  
After Strate, civil conflicts exclusively between non-Indians will 
generally not fall under Muscogee Creek Nation jurisdiction as long as the 
locus of the conflict occurs on non-Indian-owned land, or if the non-Indian 
party has not consented to tribal jurisdiction. This outcome is supported by 
the result in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., in 
which the Supreme Court held that under the Montana test, tribes did not 
have jurisdiction over the on-reservation sale of non-Indian-owned fee land 
between non-Indian parties.
237
 Thus, the expansion of Muscogee Creek 
Nation tribal jurisdiction over civil adjudicatory disputes will be limited to 
instances in which the non-tribal member has consented to jurisdiction, 
situations that trigger a Montana exception, or instances when federal law 
mandates tribal jurisdiction. 
A. Civil Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Murphy 
Civil adjudicatory jurisdiction will be the area of the greatest tribal 
jurisdictional expansion if Murphy is upheld because the Montana 1 
exception governs consensual commercial relationships between tribes or 
tribal members and non-members. Because of Strate, civil adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over civil suits involving only non-members arising from 
incidents on non-member-owned land will not fall under tribal jurisdiction. 
The Muscogee Creek Nation, however, will have jurisdiction over 
potentially all commercial transactions between non-Indians and Indians on 
the reservation. 
Civil adjudicatory jurisdiction will also expand if Murphy is upheld 
because of the changes to Indian Child Welfare Act jurisdiction that 
occurred when the Muscogee Creek Nation was recognized as a 
reservation. Per the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), Muscogee Creek 
Nation Tribal Court is now the court of original jurisdiction for all ICWA 
claims arising on the reservation per § 1911.
238
 As a result, all child welfare 
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cases involving Indian children living within the boundaries of the 
Muscogee Creek Nation will be heard in Muscogee Creek Nation Tribal 
Court unless existing federal law places jurisdiction with the state.
239
 
B. Federal Question and Diversity Jurisdiction: National Farmers Union 
Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe & Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante 
Non-Indian defendants in the Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation who 
wish to contest the validity of tribal jurisdiction in a civil adjudicatory case 
will most likely be subject to the tribal exhaustion doctrine.
240
 National 
Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe
241
 is the governing case for 
determining whether a civil case is properly before a tribal court. In 
National Farmers Union, the Court declared that “[t]he question whether an 
Indian tribe retains the power to compel a non-Indian property owner to 
submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered 
by reference to federal law and is a ‘federal question’ under [28 U.S.C.] § 
1331.”
242
 Nevertheless, even though federal courts may adjudicate this 
jurisdictional question, National Farmers Union requires that non-Indian 
defendants must almost always first exhaust tribal remedies before getting 
into federal court on federal question jurisdiction.
243
 The tribal exhaustion 
doctrine does not apply to bad faith assertions of jurisdiction, instances 
where there is clearly no tribal jurisdiction, or where it is futile due to the 
“‘lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.’”
244
 
The Supreme Court extended the National Farmers Union analysis to 
diversity jurisdiction in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante.
245
 Citing 
National Farmers Union, the Court required exhaustion of tribal remedies 
before allowing the question of tribal jurisdictional validity to be heard in 
federal district court.
246
 Once again, its reasoning was that “proper respect 
for tribal legal institutions requires that they be given a ‘full opportunity’ to 
consider the issues before them and ‘to rectify any errors’” before assuming 
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The one limited instance in which state jurisdiction may be proper is 
characterized in Nevada v. Hicks.
248
 After Hicks, tribes may not assert 
jurisdiction over civil adjudicatory claims against state law enforcement 
officers who enter tribal land to execute a search warrant on a tribal 
member suspected of violating state law while off the reservation.
249
 This 
case could be limited entirely to its facts, as the Court emphasized that 
“[s]elf-government and internal relations are not directly at issue here, 
since the issue is whether the Tribe’s law will apply, not to their own 




The jurisdictional expansion caused by the Murphy decision will increase 
the possibility of appearing in tribal court, and, as a result, the possibility 
that a client will encounter the tribal court exhaustion doctrine. Still, even if 
it does apply to a given civil action, there are numerous exceptions to the 
doctrine, particularly through contractual language.
251
 Thus, it is quite 
possible for a client to reach federal court on a jurisdictional question 
without having to exhaust tribal remedies.  
VII. Conclusion 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Murphy v. Royal properly recognizes the 
Muscogee Creek Nation as an intact reservation with § 1151(a) jurisdiction 
based on governing Supreme Court jurisprudence. Recognizing the 
Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation as § 1151(a) jurisdiction primarily 
expands Muscogee Creek Nation jurisdiction over Indian residents of the 
Reservation while only automatically increasing its jurisdiction over non-
Indians in limited circumstances, such as VAWA 2013 criminal cases and 
some civil regulatory capacities. Subsequently, non-Indian residents of the 
Muscogee Creek Nation will see minimal, if any, change in jurisdiction that 
impacts their day-to-day lives without their consent. 
The Tenth Circuit denied en banc review of Murphy on November 9th, 
2017.
252
 Chief Judge Tymkovich issued a concurrence along with the 
denial, noting first that an “en banc court would necessarily reach the same 
result, since Supreme Court precedent precludes any other outcome.”
253
 As 
                                                                                                             
 248. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
 249. Id. at 364. 
 250. Id. at 371. 
 251. See generally COHEN, supra note 5, § 7.04[3], at 630-36. 
 252. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 253. Id. at 966. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss2/4
No. 2] COMMENTS 389 
 
 
he plainly states, the primary purpose of his concurrence is to encourage 
Supreme Court review.
254
 The State, on behalf of the warden, filed its 
petition for writ of certiorari on February 6, 2018.
255
 The U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on May 21, 2018. 
                                                                                                             
 254. Id. at 966-68.  
 255. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 223. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
